(4) the parties may not have otherwise waived the privilege. 6 The application of the common interest doctrine varies greatly and depends on both the circumstances and the jurisdiction. 7 The doctrine's jurisdictional inconsistency makes it difficult, if not impossible, for attorneys to accurately predict what actions will waive attorney-client privilege and subject sensitive materials to discovery in a subsequent litigation. 8 Parties seeking to reap the benefits of the common interest doctrine need to clear two general hurdles: first, the jurisdiction must recognize the doctrine; and second, the parties must have a sufficient "common interest" as defined by that state. 9 Courts particularly struggle to define when parties share a "common interest." The most common approaches can be grouped into three stances: (1) courts do not recognize the common interest doctrine at all; (2) they recognize the common interest doctrine, but pending or anticipated litigation is required; or, most broadly, (3) they recognize the common interest doctrine as long as the parties share a common legal interest. 10 The requirement, or lack thereof, of pending or anticipated litigation usually dictates whether the common interest doctrine can be applied in a transactional setting.
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Courts requiring pending or anticipated litigation reason that parties cooperating outside of litigation are less likely to have a common legal interest and are more likely serving their own commercial interests. 12 In contrast, a number of courts have extended the common interest doctrine to situations outside of litigation. 13 There are a number of legal situations in which parties cooperate outside of the litigation context: "applying for patents;" "conducting due diligence," in mergers, acquisitions, or other commercial transactions; "ensuring that mutually beneficial advertising is not misleading;" and ensuring compliance with the law in order to avoid "liability [ interest doctrine has been most widely discussed in patent law and substantial business transactions, such as mergers and acquisitions. 15 Both of these situations involve parties that are arguably adverse, as they generally sit on opposite sides of a negotiating table, but still have a common interest in the patent, or successful completion of the deal. 16 Courts applying the common interest doctrine to such situations reason that they should not create a "procedural doctrine that restricts communication [s] between buyers and sellers, [and] erects barriers to business deals." 17 This Comment argues that Kansas should recognize the common interest doctrine in a form that protects parties both within and outside the scope of anticipated or pending litigation. This form allows parties to predict whether information will be disclosed and furthers the rationale behind attorney-client privilege. Moreover, failure to recognize the common interest doctrine has both economic and ethical consequences for both Kansas attorneys and the Kansas judicial system.
Part II of this Comment provides the background of the common interest doctrine, including its roots in attorney-client privilege, its evolution from the joint defense doctrine, and an overview of the modern doctrine across jurisdictions, as well as Kansas. Part III argues that Kansas should recognize the common interest doctrine "to encourage the free flow of information and to enhance effective legal advice." 18 Additionally, it argues that Kansas should recognize and define a fairly broad version of the common interest doctrine, in order to provide clarity and certainty to Kansas attorneys and best align itself with other persuasive jurisdictions.
II. BACKGROUND
The common interest doctrine is rooted in the attorney-client privilege doctrine and developed as an extension to the joint defense doctrine. 19 Today, jurisdictions have recognized the common interest doctrine in a variety of forms, ranging from broadly-worded statutes to cases restricting the doctrine to narrow factual scenarios. 20 Jurisdictions vary most on two The client, the attorney(s), and any of their agents who help facilitate the attorney-client communications or legal representation are considered "privileged persons." 24 Only the client can waive the privilege. 25 Because legal advice is often sought for the sole purpose of avoiding litigation or ensuring compliance with the law, the contemplation of litigation is not a prerequisite for protection under attorney-client privilege. 26 Attorney-client privilege is considered the oldest common-law privilege and is an exception to the maxim that the public has the right to "every man's evidence."
27 It serves to encourage frank communication between attorneys and clients and in doing so, promotes the broader public interest "in the observance of law and administration of justice." 28 However, courts have reasoned that this also limits the truth-seeking process, so the privilege is generally construed narrowly. 29 ideals extend to the common interest doctrine and as such, the justifications and critiques of attorney-client privilege carry over to the common interest doctrine. 31 Corporations, like individual clients, can claim attorney-client privilege.
32 Attorney-client privilege allows corporations to structure their behavior in a way that complies with the law through advice from corporate counsel. 33 In Upjohn Co. v. United States, the Supreme Court articulated the rationale for corporations' use of attorney-client privilege, reasoning that a narrow interpretation of the privilege "not only makes it difficult for corporate attorneys to formulate sound advice when their client is faced with a specific legal problem but also threatens to limit the valuable efforts of corporate counsel to ensure their client's compliance with the law." 34 The Court went on to distinguish individuals' and corporations' use of the law: "[C]orporations, unlike most individuals, 'constantly go to lawyers to find out how to obey the law,' particularly since compliance with the law in this area is hardly an instinctive matter." 35 The Upjohn decision reinforced the universally accepted idea that corporate communications deserve protection under attorney-client privilege, just as individuals are entitled to. 36 However, the applicability of this idea under the common interest doctrine is largely uncertain, as jurisdictions have inconsistently applied the doctrine to situations involving corporate attorney-client privilege.
37
Because the common interest doctrine is rooted in attorney-client privilege, it cannot apply unless the underlying communication would have been protected prior to its disclosure. 38 Therefore, it is critical that the underlying communication is protected by attorney-client privilege and has not been otherwise waived, or the common interest doctrine is not applicable. 
B. Waiver of Attorney-Client Privilege
Generally, the disclosure of an otherwise privileged communication to a third party constitutes a waiver of attorney-client privilege. 39 Similarly, communications made in the presence of third parties are not privileged. 40 These acts of disclosure signal that the communication was not intended to be kept confidential or secret. 41 Waiver can be express, or implied through actions. 42 Implied waiver is especially high risk because waiving attorneyclient privilege on one communication-for example, a patent opinion-will usually waive all communications related to that matter, such as emails, memoranda, and other communications related to the patent. 43 Moreover, even a discussion of the privileged communications' general subject matter may constitute an implied waiver. 44 Other courts, concerned by the potentially grave consequences of implied waiver, only find an implied waiver if it jeopardizes fairness-such as when communications are partially disclosed and fairness requires disclosure of the entire communication "to provide a complete context." 45 The common interest doctrine works as an exception to implied waiver for communications made to a third party sharing a common legal interest. 46 The purpose of the doctrine, similar to that of attorney-client privilege, is "to encourage the free flow of information and [] enhance the quality of legal advice."
47 By protecting parties with a common legal interest from waiving attorney-client privilege, the common interest doctrine allows attorneys and their clients to make more precise predictions about the risk of waiver and how to avoid it.
48

C. The Joint Defense Doctrine
The common interest doctrine evolved from the joint defense doctrineone of the first expansions on the scope of attorney-client privilege. 49 The joint defense doctrine was the first exception to the general rule that attorney-client privilege is waived upon disclosure of privileged communications to a third party. 50 It applies when a client shares privileged information with co-defendants for the purpose of forming a common defense strategy. 51 The doctrine was originally only applied to criminal codefendants 52 but has since been expanded to include civil co-defendants.
53
The 1871 case, Chahoon v. Commonwealth, 54 is recognized as the first case to apply the joint defense doctrine. 55 In Chahoon, Virginia's highest court permitted criminal defense attorneys to coordinate their clients' strategies and still retain attorney-client privilege for their communications. 56 The court reasoned:
[W]hether they [employed the same counsel, or employed different counsel as they did], the effect is the same, as to their right of communication to each and all of the counsel, and as to the privilege of such communication. They had the same defence [sic] to make, the act of one . . . being the act of all, and the counsel of each was in effect the counsel of all, though, for purposes of convenience, he was employed and paid by his respective client. They had a right, all the accused and their counsel, to consult together about the case and the defence, [sic] and it follows as a necessary consequence, that all the information, derived by any of the counsel from such consultation, is privileged, and the privilege belongs to each and all of the clients, and cannot be released without the consent of all of them. Almost seventy-five years passed before the Minnesota Supreme Court expanded the joint defense privilege from strictly criminal co-defendants to include civil co-defendants in Schmitt v. Emery. 58 Counsels for several codefendants exchanged a privileged document to prepare for objections to the document's admission into evidence. 59 The court held that this communication between counsel was privileged because the communication was made "in confidence, for the limited and restricted purpose to assist in asserting their common claims."
60 Schmitt marked the first steps toward today's common interest doctrine.
D. The Modern Common Interest Doctrine: Two Major Issues
As courts began to expand the joint defense doctrine from strictly criminal co-defendants, the common interest doctrine emerged. 61 Nevertheless, jurisdictions did not apply it uniformly, creating confusion and inconsistency about how and when the doctrine applies. 62 Generally, courts that recognize the doctrine require the invoking party to prove: (1) the underlying communication is protected by attorney-client privilege; (2) the parties had a common interest at the time the information was disclosed; (3) the information was shared in furtherance of that common interest; and (4) the parties have not waived the privilege. 63 The privilege usually only applies where the clients are represented by separate counsel.
64
Several issues arise when courts apply the common interest doctrine: (1) "What is a common interest?" (2) Does the common interest doctrine require pending or anticipated litigation? (3) Does the doctrine apply to communications made in the absence of counsel? (4) Does the common interest doctrine apply "absent a written confidentiality agreement?" (5) Who can waive the common interest doctrine protection? 65 Thus, while courts generally require the parties to share a "legal interest," how that requirement is interpreted varies and is jurisdictionally dependent.
There are some situations where the interest is purely commercial, and thus, the common interest doctrine does not apply. In Cavallaro v. United States, two companies owned by the same family merged, and the merged entity sold for a substantial amount. 75 The IRS investigated, suspecting the family overvalued the company to conceal a post-merger gift to their sons. 76 As part of the investigation, the IRS issued a summons to the defendant's accounting firm who provided pre-merger tax advice. 77 The family argued the communications were protected by attorney-client privilege because the accountant aided the law firm that provided legal advice concerning tax and merger issues. Courts routinely disagree on whether the common interest doctrine applies absent pending or current litigation. 82 Generally, the requirement of During discovery, Bank of America withheld the communications, claiming that they were protected by the common interest doctrine because they pertained to legal issues connected with completing the merger. 92 Ambac argued that the voluntary sharing of confidential communications prior to the merger's closing waived attorney-client privilege because it did not relate to pending or anticipated litigation. 93 Reversing the appellate decision, a divided four-two court held that the common interest doctrine did not apply absent pending or anticipated litigation, reasoning:
[A]ny benefits that may attend . . . an expansion of the doctrine are outweighed by the substantial loss of relevant evidence, as well as the potential for abuse. The difficulty of defining "common legal interests" outside the context of litigation could result in the loss of evidence of a wide range of communications between parties who assert common legal interests but who really have only non-legal or exclusively business interests to protect. 94 The majority noted that New York's formulation is "limited to situations where the benefit and the necessity of shared communications are at their highest, and the potential for misuse is minimal." 95 On the other hand, Judge Jenny Rivera, joined in the dissent by Judge Michael Garcia, reasoned that the "better rule is grounded not in the rote application of a litigation requirement, but in the legal dynamics of a modern corporate transactional practice." 100 Bausch & Lomb contended, however, it disclosed the letter in anticipation of litigation because there was a real possibility that the third party would buy the division, and then that both Bausch & Lomb and the third party could face litigation with HewlettPackard over the subject patent. 101 The third party did not buy the division, therefore only Bausch & Lomb faced litigation over the patent. 102 Regardless, the court held privilege was not waived. 103 Bausch & Lomb took substantial steps to ensure the potential buyer maintained the letter's confidentiality: only two copies were made, the buyer was instructed no further copies were to be made, both copies were returned to Bausch & Lomb, and the letter was not disclosed to others.
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While the court noted that, at the time the communication was made, joint litigation could be plausibly anticipated, the court relied more heavily on public policy concerns weighing against the finding of waiver:
[E]xpansive definitions of waiver can pressure lawyers to claim privilege on documents that they would otherwise disclose and to litigate tenaciously the resulting discovery disputes all because the risks of inadvertent waiver are so great. Thus expansive waiver doctrine increases the cost of litigation to the parties and increases the number of discovery disputes courts must resolve. Moreover, the risk of waiver can create an advantage for those litigants who can afford the massive expenditures often required to protect against waiver. 105 Reasoning that the principal purpose of waiver should be to protect against parties who use privilege unfairly, the court distinguished between "partial" and "selective" disclosure. 106 Partial disclosure occurs when a party uses In holding that Bausch & Lomb had not waived attorney-client privilege when it shared the document, the court reasoned:
Legal doctrine that impedes frank communication between buyers and sellers also sets the stage for more lawsuits, as buyers are more likely to be unpleasantly surprised by what they receive. By refusing to find waiver in these settings courts create an environment in which businesses can share more freely information that is relevant to their transactions. This policy lubricates business deals and encourages more openness in transactions of this nature.
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The Hewlett-Packard court's concerns about waiver's impact on business transactions took the opposite position from the Ambac court.
As illustrated by Hewlett-Packard and Ambac, whether the jurisdiction requires litigation leads to an entirely different result in factually similar situations. As the court noted in Hewlett-Packard, a finding of wavier in these situations can have grave impacts not only on the parties involved, but in the larger economic scheme as well.
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E. The National Spectrum
An overwhelming majority of states have concluded that attorney-client privilege is not waived when privileged information is shared with coparties. 112 In federal courts, the common interest doctrine is "well recognized in all circuits that have considered it."
113 As courts separately determined how to define the common interest doctrine's elements, a variety of applications arose. 114 Jurisdictions generally fall into three categories: (1) they recognize the common interest doctrine and require pending or anticipated litigation; (2) they recognize the common interest doctrine and do not require pending or anticipated litigation-these jurisdictions are most likely to apply the common interest doctrine in transactional situations; (3) they do not recognize the common interest doctrine at all. 115 Of the jurisdictions that recognize the doctrine, some have codified their approach while others have left it to common law. 116 This section provides an overview of the national spectrum as it sits today from broad applicationMassachusetts and Delaware-to narrow-New York and Texas.
The Restatement of the Law Governing Lawyers recognizes the broadest version of the common interest doctrine:
If two or more clients with a common interest in a litigated or nonlitigated matter are represented by separate lawyers and they agree to exchange information concerning the matter, a communication of any such client that otherwise qualifies as privileged under § § 68-72 that relates to the matter is privileged as against third persons. Any such client may invoke the privilege, unless it has been waived by the client who made the communication.
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The Restatement's formulation is broad enough that it recognizes the privilege as used by co-defendants in both criminal and civil suits as well as in mergers and transactions between entities.
118 However, Massachusetts is the only state that has adopted the Restatement version. adopt a broader interpretation of the common interest doctrine.
121 Actual or pending litigation is not required under the rule or statutory definition, however, in some situations parties may need to at least anticipate litigation.
122 Delaware courts have extended the doctrine to communications in business transactions as long as the communications concern actual legal advice.
123
"Actual legal advice" includes communications about legal advice for business matters, regulatory matters, and compliance, but not communications dealing primarily with business interests.
124
Each federal circuit recognizes some form of the common interest doctrine. 125 The federal common interest doctrine generally leans towards a broader interpretation, and the majority of federal circuits and some state courts that have addressed the issue do not require pending or anticipated litigation.
126 However, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals has expressly required anticipated or pending litigation. On the other end of the spectrum, New York employs a strict interpretation of the common interest doctrine.
128 Unlike Delaware and Massachusetts, New York has not codified its common interest doctrine. However, New York case law restricts its doctrine to civil and criminal matters, co-plaintiffs and co-defendants, and only in the context of pending or reasonably anticipated litigation.
129 New York courts have uniformly rejected attempts at expanding the common interest doctrine to communications that do not involve pending or reasonably anticipated litigation. 130 In Ambac Assurance Corp. v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., as previously discussed, New York's highest court declined to apply the doctrine in the merger context, reasoning: "when businesses share a common interest in closing a complex transaction, their shared interest in the transaction's completion is already an adequate incentive for exchanging information necessary to achieve that end." 131 The court further opined that any benefit reaped by the extension of the doctrine is outweighed by the loss of relevant evidence and potential for abuse.
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Similarly, Texas employs a narrow version of the common interest doctrine and has codified it as such. 133 Texas Rule of Evidence 503(b)(1)(C) extends attorney-client privilege to communications concerning a matter of common interest in the pending action.
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To align with this statutory definition, Texas courts refer to the doctrine as the "allied litigant doctrine" as opposed to the common interest doctrine. 135 Texas, similar to New York, sought to limit the privilege to situations where the benefit and necessity are 127. BDO Seidman, LLP, 492 F.3d at 816 n.6 (citing to cases in the First, Second, Fourth, Ninth, and Federal Circuits, and noting that only the Fifth Circuit has held that at least a threat of litigation is necessary); In re Santa Fe, 272 F.3d at 711 ("[I]n looking at other cases discussing the [common interest] privilege in this circuit, it appears that there must be a palpable threat of litigation at the time of the communication, rather than a mere awareness that one's questionable conduct might some day result in litigation, before communications . . . could qualify for protection.").
128. While the national spectrum varies, it trends towards recognition of the common interest doctrine in some form. 138 Kansas is in the minority of states that do not yet recognize any form of the doctrine.
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F. The Uncertainty of the Common Interest Doctrine in Kansas
Kansas does not yet recognize the common interest doctrine in any form. 140 The Kansas Rules of Evidence lay out Kansas's attorney-client privilege law and its exceptions, but do not explicitly recognize either the joint defense or the common interest doctrine. 141 The 1984 criminal case State v. Maxwell 142 is the only Kansas state court case truly discussing the joint defense doctrine and, while it appears to recognize the joint defense doctrine, more recent cases have questioned its validity. 143 Although the common interest doctrine is regularly applied in Kansas federal courts, no state court has discussed or applied the doctrine. 148 Maxwell sought to admit evidence that this trial testimony was inconsistent with prior statements made in the presence of their common counsel. 149 The trial court found that the attorney-client privilege applied to these statements and refused to admit the statements. 150 On appeal, Maxwell argued that attorney-client privilege was waived because the statements were made in the presence of all the defendants, and, in the alternative, if the statements were privileged, the privilege was waived when original counsel disclosed the information to the assistant district attorney. 151 The Court of Appeals disagreed, and in affirming the trial court, recognized the joint defense privilege:
Where two or more persons jointly consult an attorney concerning mutual concerns, their confidential communications with the attorney, although known to each other, will be privileged in controversies of either or both of the clients with the outside world.
. . .
The joint defense privilege encompasses shared communications "to the extent that they concern common issues and are intended to facilitate representation in possible subsequent proceedings." It is also essential that the codefendants have exchanged the information in confidence, "not . . . for the purpose of allowing unlimited publication and use, but rather . . . for the limited purpose of assisting in their common cause." Furthermore, when a third party seeks to have those communications disclosed, none of the clients-not even a majority-can waive the privilege. 153 However, the facts in Maxwell limited the holding to situations where multiple criminal defendants were commonly represented by one attorney.
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Since Maxwell, the joint defense doctrine has been rarely mentioned, and never fully discussed, in a Kansas state court case. Fifteen years after Maxwell, the Kansas Supreme Court declined to rule on the joint defense doctrine in the civil case Associated Wholesale Grocers v. Americold Corp. 155 Although the parties referenced the joint defense doctrine in their briefs, the court declined to address it because none of the experts, parties, nor the district court referenced the statutory attorney-client privilege in K.S.A. section 60-426. 156 However, the court questioned the validity of the doctrine: "Without a credible argument for recognition of the joint defense doctrine based on the language of the attorney-client privilege statute itself [K.S.A. section 60-426] proponents of the joint defense doctrine are vulnerable to attack." 157 However, federal courts applying Kansas law have seemingly extended the Kansas state courts' version of the joint defense doctrine. In the civil case Burton v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., Judge John W. Lungstrum relied on Maxwell in holding that certain documents sought in discovery were privileged. 158 Defendants were members of the Council for Tobacco Research (CTR), along with other members of the tobacco industry, and were represented by separate counsel. 159 In discovery, plaintiff "sought all documents relat[ed] to the CTR special projects" but defendant claimed the documents were protected by attorney-client privilege under the joint defense doctrine. 160 The court agreed with defendant in holding the joint defense doctrine includes "shared communications to the extent that they concern common issues and are intended to facilitate representation in possible subsequent proceedings." 161 However, the information must have been shared in confidence solely for assisting the common cause. The status of joint defense doctrine in Kansas is uncertain to say the least. As the common interest doctrine's predecessor, this uncertainty leaves the common interest doctrine on unsteady ground.
The Common Interest Doctrine in Kansas
The common interest doctrine is currently non-existent under Kansas state law. The Kansas Rules of Evidence are silent on the common interest doctrine and Kansas state courts have rarely mentioned it, never discussing it in detail or applying it. Alternatively, Kansas federal courts have embraced the doctrine.
While Kansas state courts have never fully discussed the common interest doctrine, the Kansas Court of Appeals briefly addressed it in Smith v. Philip Morris Cos. 163 Smith brought a class action against a number of tobacco companies claiming they were conspiring to fix cigarette prices in Kansas. 164 Discovery disputes over whether the joint-defense privilege is recognized under Kansas law prompted the court to appoint Special Master Judge Buchanan. 165 The trial court concluded that Special Master Judge Buchanan correctly applied Kansas law when he ruled that privilege was waived when communications were shared with jointly-aligned co-parties. 166 In doing so, Buchanan rejected both the joint defense doctrine and the common interest doctrine. 167 Ironically, the trial court cited State v. Maxwell and Associated Wholesale Grocers in supporting a rejection of the doctrine. 168 Defendants sought review of the trial court's order by filing a petition for writ of mandamus to the Kansas Supreme Court. 169 Numerous groups filed amicus briefs arguing Judge Smith's ruling was erroneous on the common interest doctrine issue. 170 The Kansas Supreme Court issued an order denying the defendants' petition for mandamus on procedural grounds in which it emphasized that it was not expressing an opinion on the validity of either the joint defense or common interest doctrine. 171 In not flat-out rejecting the doctrines, the court preserved the issue for another day. 172 Conversely, federal courts applying Kansas law recognize the common interest doctrine and have applied it on several occasions. In Sawyer v. Southwest Airlines, the United States District Court of Kansas did not find the lack of Kansas statutes or cases recognizing the common interest doctrine to be fatal. 173 Southwest shared documents with its insurer, Global, and Sawyer claimed this waived attorney-client privilege. 174 Southwest argued this was not a waiver because Global was a client of the same attorney, and Global's claims attorney requested legal advice in the matter. 175 The court noted it did not matter whether the court applied Kansas or federal attorney-client privilege law because the law is the same under both.
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Magistrate Judge Waxse found that Southwest met the elements of the common interest doctrine, and held that for the doctrine to attach, the two parties must share a common interest in "securing legal advice related to the same matter-and that the communications [must] be made to advance" the common interest. 
III. ANALYSIS
While the common interest doctrine's jurisdictional inconsistency is far from ideal, Kansas's failure to recognize the doctrine in any form is especially problematic. Kansas should recognize the common interest doctrine to: provide clarity and certainty for Kansas attorneys and their clients; further the goals of attorney-client privilege; promote efficiency and eliminate unnecessary costs; and align itself with the national trend and highly persuasive courts. The means Kansas chooses is not as important as the ends, in that Kansas should recognize a form that is clearly defined, thus increasing the value of the doctrine and decreasing the risks.
To accomplish these goals, Kansas should recognize a fairly broad version of the common interest doctrine. The elements of an ideal Kansas common interest doctrine include: a communication otherwise protected by attorney-client privilege; made between two parties sharing a common legal interest; made in furtherance of the common interest; and that the privilege has not otherwise been waived.
While the common interest doctrine is ripe for discussion in Kansas courts, Kansas attorneys should be wary of relying on the doctrine in the meantime. However, there are a number of things Kansas attorneys can do to help sway the presumption toward privilege.
A. Why Kansas Should Recognize the Common Interest Doctrine
The current state of not only the common interest doctrine, but also the joint defense privilege in Kansas is highly unsettled. While State v. Maxwell appeared to explicitly recognize the joint defense privilege in at least the criminal context, 179 Associated Wholesale Grocers and Philip Morris Cos. questioned the validity of or declined to apply the doctrines to the civil context. 180 This uncertainty is problematic for attorneys, and unfair to their clients.
It creates a problematic conflict between Kansas law and the national trend. Moreover, it discourages parties from disclosing attorney-client privileged information to commonly interested parties and "undermines the goals of the attorney-client privilege" in addition to a less efficient and more expensive judicial system. 181 A recognition of the common interest doctrine As it currently stands, Kansas attorneys and their clients cannot be sure whether their case will be the one that the court finally decides to apply the common interest doctrine to, or whether their communication to a third party will waive attorney-client privilege. Recognizing the common interest doctrine would allow Kansas to serve the underlying purpose of attorneyclient privilege, and create fluidity with courts that Kansas aligns closely with. Kansas is one of the last jurisdictions to not recognize the common interest doctrine in some capacity, and as such, Kansas attorneys and parties are at a huge disadvantage under conflict of law principles. This is especially problematic in cases where similar lawsuits are pending, or have been filed in multiple states against the same defendants. 187 Thus, opposing counsel will be able to obtain information that otherwise would have been privileged in that jurisdiction, but negated by Kansas.
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A Kansas rejection of the common interest doctrine would also have consequences on the doctrine nationally. It would be impossible for coparties to confidently share privileged information in states where the common interest doctrine is alive and well, for fear of a potential similar suit in Kansas. 189 Additionally, if Kansas were a "lone ranger" in rejecting the common interest doctrine, parties would have an incentive to file in Kansas in order to gain access to communications that would be otherwise privileged under other states' law. 190 This could lead to Kansas courts being swamped with claims in an effort to avoid an evidentiary privilege that the majority of other jurisdictions recognize. Kansas's recognition of the common interest doctrine would serve the purpose of the attorney-client privilege by encouraging the "free flow of information . . . [and] enhancing the effectiveness of counsel." 192 If the purpose of attorney-client privilege is to be served, attorneys and their clients must be able to predict with some certainty what communications or discussions will be privileged. 193 Kansas's failure to recognize the doctrine, or even engage in a guiding discussion about it, makes it difficult for Kansas attorneys to predict what communications will remain privileged if shared with a commonly interested third party. Kansas attorneys can hardly serve their clients in the most effective manner when the courts have left them with such uncertainty about an integral privilege.
Critics of the common interest doctrine argue that "it broadens the attorney-client privilege, which is generally construed narrowly" in favor of "the over-arching search for [the] truth." 194 However, the common interest doctrine attaches only to communications that would already be protected by attorney-client privilege. 195 It does not broaden attorney-client privilege because careful parties arguably would not share those communications in the first place. An appropriate application of the doctrine allows attorneyclient privilege to function in a way that best serves its goals-"to encourage the free flow of information and to enhance the quality of legal advice"-especially when interests are aligned. 196 When the common interest doctrine is clearly defined, it allows both attorneys and courts to predict and respect attorney-client privilege. The common interest doctrine encourages parties with a common legal interest to seek assistance, obtain sound legal advice, and plan their actions in order to comply with the law. 198 Thus, by avoiding litigation in the first place, both the judicial system and the parties avoid unnecessary expenditures of time and money. Additionally, collaboration between coparties reduces time and expenses and facilitates better preparation, thus advancing the parties' representation and streamlining the judicial process.
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Rejecting the common interest doctrine leads to unnecessary costs because it requires parties to unnecessarily duplicate work. Especially in litigation situations, if parties on the same side cannot share information without waiving attorney-client privilege, they are forced to hire multiple experts, write duplicative pleadings, and engage in large discovery disputes. 200 In Smith v. Philip Morris Cos., the court was forced to appoint a special master in order to deal with the volume of discovery disputes regarding whether the joint defense doctrine and the common interest doctrine were recognized in Kansas courts. 201 Smith is unlikely to be the last case with this issue, and by recognizing the common interest doctrine, Kansas courts can avoid the expenses associated with such appointments in litigation. Additionally, as discussed above, a rejection of the common interest doctrine would burden Kansas with claims solely because their privilege law departs from that of other jurisdictions. 
K.S.A section 60-426(b) Implicitly Recognizes the Common Interest Doctrine
The common interest doctrine is implicit in Kansas's attorney-client privilege statute; thus, an explicit recognition of the doctrine aligns with Kansas's current law. However, before recognizing a formal version of the common interest doctrine, Kansas should confirm the joint defense doctrine's validity. While State v. Maxwell originally recognized the joint defense doctrine in Kansas in the criminal context, its validity has since become unclear. 203 However, as it stands, the language of Kansas's attorney-client privilege statute may already recognize the joint defense and joint client doctrines.
Under K.S.A. section 60-426(a), communications between an attorney and her client are privileged when made in the "course of that relationship and in professional confidence." 206 This exception applies when an attorney has multiple clients in the same case, and those clients are later engaged adversely to one another; communications between the client and that common attorney are not privileged in the later adverse action. 207 It seems clear that this language acts as a codification of Maxwell, and the lack of civil versus criminal and plaintiff versus defendant language arguably extends Maxwell to civil co-parties as well. The language supports the proposition that the Kansas legislature intended confidential communications among jointly aligned co-parties and their common counsel to retain attorney-client privilege. There would be no exception to the privilege if those communications were not privileged to begin with. 208 The statute makes no mention of whether the parties, before the action between them, were aligned as plaintiffs or defendants. 209 Thus, it seems clear that this is a recognition of at least the joint defense/joint-client doctrine. However, Judge Smith's ruling in Philip Morris Cos. denied the existence of such a privilege. 210 While a recognition of the joint defense/joint client doctrines and the common interest doctrine would best serve the attorneys and clients of Kansas, a clarification either way is necessary.
It should be noted that Kansas courts do not need statutory authority under K.S.A. section 60-426 to recognize the common interest doctrine. While the common interest doctrine can be codified, it is not a new privilege, but an extension of attorney-client privilege as a common law privilege.
211 Therefore, the court is free to recognize the common interest doctrine through common law as well. Nevertheless, this Comment argues that the language of section 60-426 indeed already supports such a ruling. Additionally, even if the statute implicitly recognizes the joint defense and/or common interest doctrine, it is not clear enough to be controlling. Thus, Kansas courts, or the legislature, need to provide attorneys with more certainty, whether through common law or statute.
Highly Persuasive Jurisdictions Recognize the Common Interest Doctrine
The national trend supports Kansas's recognition of the common interest doctrine because the majority of states and federal circuits already recognize the common interest doctrine. This trend is persuasive in itself. Moreover, two jurisdictions especially persuasive to Kansas-Kansas federal courts and Delaware-recognize and apply the common interest doctrine consistently.
a. Kansas Federal Courts
The United States District Court for the District of Kansas and the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals have explicitly recognized both the joint defense and common interest doctrines. 213 While these decisions are not binding on Kansas state courts, Kansas state courts should follow in the steps of their federal counterparts in recognizing the common interest doctrine.
Because Kansas federal courts applying Kansas law are especially persuasive, the District of Kansas's common interest doctrine recognition should influence Kansas state courts. 214 Federal courts look to state law in deciding privilege questions when presented with both federal and state claims. 215 The District of Kansas (applying Kansas law) applied the common interest doctrine in Sawyer v. Southwest Airlines, noting that the lack of Kansas case law or statute recognizing the common interest doctrine was not fatal. 216 In support of the ruling, it quoted the Kansas Supreme Court: "[T]he attorney-client privilege is important to the administration of justice and should not be set aside lightly." 217 Because the District of Kansas applied the common interest doctrine while looking to Kansas privilege law for guidance, a Kansas state court recognition logically follows.
The Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit also recognizes the doctrine: "[W]hen the disclosure is to a party with a common interest, the . . . 'common interest' doctrine provides an exception to waiver because disclosure advances the representation of the party and the attorney's preparation of the case." 218 Additionally, the Tenth Circuit, interpreting Kansas privilege law, cited the Kansas attorney-client privilege statute's broad language to conclude that Kansas prefers a broad approach to privilege. 219 While Kansas courts are not required to follow Tenth Circuit decisions, they are considered persuasive authority. 220 When Kansas statutes are modeled after federal statutes, federal decisions interpreting those statutes are persuasive for interpreting and applying the Kansas statute. 221 While the Kansas and federal attorney-client privilege statues are not identical, they function as such. 222 As the Sawyer court stated, whether the court applied Kansas or federal law makes no difference, because the elements of attorney-client privilege under each are essentially identical. 223 Thus, Kansas should follow federal precedents applying Kansas attorney-client privilege and, subsequently, the common interest doctrine.
Kansas would not be the first jurisdiction to recognize the common interest doctrine based off its respective federal court. The Court of Appeals of Michigan took a similar approach in recognizing the common interest doctrine in D'Alessandro Contracting Group, LLC v. Wright. 224 The court reasoned that the "[f]ederal courts' application of the common-interest doctrine [was] instructive." 225 "[B] ecause both the state and federal rules" were "virtually identical," Michigan relied on federal cases for guidance in the state court's recognition of the common interest doctrine. 226 Kansas should follow Michigan's example and use the federal courts' recognition of the common interest doctrine as guidance for Kansas state courts.
b. Delaware
Delaware recognizes a broad version of the common interest doctrine and Kansas's failure to recognize the doctrine disadvantages Kansas corporations relying on Delaware law. Kansas has a long history of reliance on Delaware corporate law for guidance in applying Kansas corporation law, as most of it is "nearly identical" to Delaware's. 227 While attorney-client privilege and corporation law are clearly very different aspects of the law, they become remarkably intermingled in the application of the common interest doctrine. 228 As such, Kansas should look to Delaware's formation of the common interest doctrine.
Delaware's common interest doctrine is codified in the Delaware Uniform Rules of Evidence 502(b)(3):
A client has a privilege to refuse to disclose and to prevent any other person from disclosing confidential communications made for the purpose of facilitating the rendition of professional legal services to the client . . . (3) by the client or the client's representative or the client's lawyer or a representative of the lawyer to a lawyer or a representative of a lawyer representing another in a matter of common interest . . . . The comments to Rule 502(b)(3) confirm that the doctrine applies absent pending litigation. 229 By accepting Delaware's corporation law, but ignoring its interpretation of the common interest doctrine, Kansas corporations and their attorneys are forced to mix and match law. The possibility of relying on the wrong precedent creates several issues including potential malpractice or the inadvertent waiver of attorney-client privilege.
Delaware has a long reputation of being one of the best states to incorporate in. 230 Kansas, among other states, has modeled its corporate law off Delaware's to remain attractive to businesses. 231 Delaware arguably chose to not require pending or anticipated litigation to maintain its corporate friendly climate.
Kansas corporations and attorneys are at a disadvantage because of this conflict between Kansas and Delaware law. The Kansas Secretary of State reported a record number of businesses formed in both 2014 and 2015. 232 The total number of Kansas business entities in 2015 was 179,665.
233 If Kansas wants to continue this increase in business entities, it should look to more than just Delaware's corporation law. If Kansas recognizes the common interest doctrine, it is essential that it does so in a way that allows the privilege to function in certain forms of business transactions. This would provide Kansas attorneys with a more predictable privilege and would incentivize Kansas businesses to negotiate and deal with one another in a way that complies with the law and reduces secrecy. Additionally, it allows Kansas corporate attorneys to rely on the law that has guided them for decades-Delaware's.
B. How Kansas Should Recognize the Common Interest Doctrine
Courts have adopted the common interest doctrine in several ways: some have codified their own version of the doctrine; some have modeled their code from Proposed Rule of Evidence 503(b); while others have left the doctrine to common law. 234 Ideally, Kansas should codify the common interest doctrine to ensure that the doctrine is well defined and has appropriate boundaries. Kansas should adopt a broad version of the common interest doctrine to best serve the underlying purposes of both the doctrine and attorney-client privilege.
To ensure that the common interest doctrine is not abused and best serves its purpose-to encourage the free flow of information-Kansas must define the boundaries of the doctrine. Ideally, the elements for Kansas's recognition include: (1) a communication that is otherwise protected by attorney-client privilege; (2) made between two parties sharing a common legal interest; (3) the communication was made in furtherance of the common interest; and (4) the parties did not otherwise waive the privilege. Once the court determines that the underlying communication is attorneyclient privileged and the parties did not otherwise waive the privilege, it can turn to the applicability of the common interest doctrine. Thus, this Comment focuses on how Kansas should define more disputed elements: "between two parties sharing a common legal interest;" and "the communication was made in furtherance of the common interest."
Between Two Parties Sharing a Common Legal Interest
First, Kansas should not define the doctrine based on the position of the parties (criminal co-defendants; civil co-defendants; civil co-plaintiffs, etc.). The national trend applies the common interest doctrine to parties sharing a sufficiently common interest, regardless of their position. 236 Moreover, restricting the doctrine based on the position of the parties creates confusion between the common interest doctrine and other doctrines such as the joint defense or joint client doctrines. 237 Thus, Kansas should apply the common interest doctrine to qualified parties, regardless of their position.
Second, Kansas should define a "common legal interest" with some flexibility-the interest should be substantially common, but not necessarily identical. Yet, Kansas should join the majority of other jurisdictions in requiring that the interest is legal, and not solely commercial.
238 Parties clearly have a common legal interest when they are engaged as co-parties in litigation. 239 However, outside of the litigation context, whether parties share a common legal interest can be highly fact dependent.
In situations where the commonality is at issue, Kansas courts should require that the parties' common interests outweigh any of the parties' adverse interests. Using a balancing test ensures that the courts can evaluate the common interest with some discretion and act as a "gate keeper" for parties attempting to use the doctrine to cheat the system. 240 At the same time, parties seeking privilege under the doctrine for the furtherance of a truly common interest should have no trouble showing that to the court.
However, Kansas should consciously require that parties share a true "legal interest." For example, in the transactional context, Kansas should be wary of applying the doctrine to communications made outside of due diligence. Courts should consider whether the transaction will lead to a "transfer of liabilities from one party to the other" as a basis for whether the parties shared a common interest. 241 This reasoning can apply to numerous situations including mergers, acquisitions, patent sales, and negotiations. Applying the doctrine outside these transactional situations raises the risk of parties using the doctrine for leverage or to persuade investors as opposed to compliance with the law. Situations involving a transfer of liability are more likely to serve the interests of parties with actual common interests, instead of using common interest for secrecy. 242 Third, and most importantly, Kansas should not require pending or anticipated litigation for the common interest doctrine to attach. Requiring pending or anticipated litigation departs from attorney-client privilege's common law roots. 243 The underlying purpose of both attorney-client privilege and the common interest doctrine is "to encourage the free flow of information and to enhance the quality of legal advice." 244 Attorney-client privilege does not require pending or anticipated litigation to attach, most notably because litigation is not always the motivating factor for a client's communication of private information. 245 There are a number of important legal situations outside of litigation where parties have common legal interests. 246 For example, the corporate attorney-client privilege encourages seeking legal advice in order to comply with the complex regulations many companies face. 247 Given that corporations generally face more complex legal issues than individuals, they likely seek legal advice more often, and thus have a larger number of privileged communications. 248 A number of other courts have joined this line of reasoning, as explained by the United States District Court for the District of Connecticut: "The timing and setting of the communications are important indicators of the measure of common interest; the shared interest necessary to justify extending the privilege to encompass intercorporate communications appears most clearly in cases of co-defendants and impending litigations but is not necessarily limited to those situations."
The "real inquiry" underlying the common interest doctrine "is not whether litigation is pending or anticipated, but whether the interest" is common and legal. 250 Moreover, the idea of "anticipated litigation" is ambiguous and vague, requiring additional judicial interpretation. 251 Arguably, parties engaged in high risk industries could be anticipating litigation at any time.
There are valid arguments against protecting communications outside the presence of pending or anticipated litigation. The "litigation required" approach ensures a narrow application of the doctrine and creates a predictable categorical rule, limiting courts' discretion. 252 Requiring anticipated or pending litigation eliminates the doctrine's application in settings where parties arguably never have a truly identical legal interestwhere parties are adverse or sitting on opposite sides of the negotiating table. 253 This type of a categorical rule would simplify application of the doctrine and thus could be more cost and time efficient for the courts. 254 However, while these arguments are valid, they choose predictability and ease of application over serving the purposes of attorney-client privilege and the common interest doctrine. Moreover, a categorical rule goes against the Supreme Court's articulation of corporate attorney-client privilege, as articulated in Upjohn, and would impose an evidentiary rule on private transactions. Kansas should require that the communication is made in furtherance of the common interest to ensure that parties are only sharing privileged communications that actually relate to their common interest. For example, there are situations where two parties clearly have a common legal interest, but they may also have a number of common non-legal interests. The existence of a common interest is not sufficient to warrant privilege, rather, the parties must demonstrate a collective cooperation in developing a common legal strategy. 257 If Kansas allowed parties with a common interest to claim privilege for all communications between them, the doctrine would become too broad and susceptible to abuse.
Additionally, Kansas should require the communications to be made through each party's respective counsel, as opposed to between the parties themselves. Again, if parties with a common interest could claim privilege on all communications between them, the doctrine becomes boundless. Requiring the communication be made between the attorneys ensures that the interest is legal, and creates a more definite boundary for where the privilege applies. This requirement is also beneficial to discovery, as communications eligible for the common interest privilege would have already been filtered through counsel. Kansas should make clear that any communications between the parties themselves, regardless of how common their interest, would constitute a waiver of privilege.
C. What Kansas Attorneys Can Do in the Meantime
Kansas should recognize the common interest doctrine either judicially or codified through the legislature. The doctrine is long overdue for discussion in Kansas, but it would be unwise for parties to rely on it in the meantime. While State v. Maxwell has not been overruled, is technically still good law, and arguably can be relied on, the more recent cases questioning the validity of Maxwell should serve as a warning to parties seeking to use the joint defense privilege, and especially the common interest doctrine. 258 Kansas attorneys seeking to use the common interest doctrine should be wary to do so in any Kansas state court, as the court's response is unpredictable and potentially unfavorable.
However, as many attorneys practice in multiple jurisdictions, it is helpful to know what parties can do to sway the presumption towards privilege. Courts have identified several things parties can do to support a finding of privilege in a common interest situation including the parties' efforts to maintain confidentiality and the existence of a written agreement. Parties' handling of privileged communications has also swayed courts towards a finding of privilege. 259 Thus, parties should take sufficient effort to maintain the communications' confidentiality, such as limiting the number of copies, limiting the shared communication to what is absolutely
IV. CONCLUSION
The common interest doctrine is an important aspect of attorney-client privilege law and Kansas should recognize it as such. Kansas's failure to recognize the common interest doctrine is problematic for attorneys, their clients, and the judicial system. It is contrary to the national trend and creates uncertainty surrounding attorney-client privilege. As such, Kansas attorneys and their clients cannot predict how the law will apply, and thus cannot conduct themselves accordingly. As a late adopter, Kansas has a unique opportunity to evaluate other jurisdictions' common interest doctrine application, and choose a form of the doctrine that best fits Kansas's goals.
The ideal solution is for Kansas to recognize the common interest doctrine either through common law, or by incorporating it into its attorneyclient privilege statute, K.S.A. § 60-426. Regardless of the means, Kansas's common interest doctrine should be clearly defined and fairly broad, consisting of the following elements: (1) a communication that is otherwise protected by attorney-client privilege; (2) made between two parties sharing a common legal interest; (3) in furtherance of the common interest; and (4) the parties did not otherwise waive the privilege. This form would allow parties to more certainly predict whether information will be disclosed, furthers the rationale behind attorney-client privilege, and allows Kansas courts to ensure that the doctrine is not abused. While this Comment proposes elements of an ideal common interest doctrine, recognizing any form would be an improvement from prolonged uncertainty that Kansas currently faces.
